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ABSTRACT. In recent years, the global loss of biodiversity has been an increasing con-
cern for many governments around the planet. Solving this problem requires working 
together and reforming existing policy frameworks. This paper explores how biodiver-
sity is governed under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy. Drawing upon Foucault’s 
governmentality concept the paper advances its own concept “governmentality of biodi-
versity”. The author identifies three overall arguments for preserving biodiversity that 
take their basis in self-centered values, de-centered values, or intrinsic values. The 
author analyzes and determines how the governmentality of biodiversity on the basis of 
the knowledge and rationality embedded in de-centered and intrinsic values promotes 
new goals for governing the Common Fisheries Policy. It is concluded that in the differ-
ent mechanisms of power, the governmentality of biodiversity yields to the rationality of 
power exercised by member states in the EU. 
Introduction 
Biodiversity is the sheer variety of life on Earth, which includes all living organisms, plants, 
animals, microorganisms, bacteria; and the diversity between species, ecosystems as well as 
within species genetics. Biodiversity has in recent years become a high priority on the interna-
tional agenda (Queffelec et al. 2009). The widespread concern is the global loss of 
biodiversity caused by human activities, global warming, dispersion of exotic species, etc. 
(Schalk 1998; Jackson 2008; Wake and Vredenburg 2008). 
According to a report from the European Environmental Agency (EEA) on biodiversity in 
the North Sea, it is asserted that “marine ecosystems are under intense pressure from fishing, 
nutrient input, recreational use and habitat loss; most notable are the effects of fisheries” 
(EEA 2002: 4). Within the existing policy framework that is regulating the fisheries, the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 
concludes in a green paper on the 2002 reform that “As far as conservation is concerned, 
many stocks are at present outside safe biological limits,” thus calling for “integration of 
environmental protection requirements into the CFP” (2001a: 4) and the need for a Biodiver-
sity Action Plan for Fisheries (BAPF). However, biodiversity is one of many concerns or 
challenges in the CFP (e.g., globalization of the economy and emergence of new countries in 
the world fisheries). Policies designed to preserve or limit the loss of biodiversity will collide 
politically with interests of exploitation (Queffelec et al. 2009). Considering that the CFP in a 
broad sense, according to scholars, has been a failure in terms of effectively regulating fisher-
ies and preventing overexploitation (Gray and Hatchard 2003; Raakjær 2009), which role will 
biodiversity then play in the overall policy? 
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This paper examines the question of biodiversity within the CFP as a critical case study, in 
an attempt to highlight a range of general problems between preservation of biodiversity and 
power. The paper does so by applying Foucault’s concept of “governmentality,” which is an 
approach that seeks to question the often taken for granted nature of governing strategies in 
given periods of time. The analysis is based on a number of documents from the CEC and 
existing literature on the topic of how the CFP functions. The overall aim of the paper is to 
investigate and explain how biodiversity is governed within the CFP. Methodologically, the 
paper does so by advancing the concept “governmentality of biodiversity”. 
The Governmentality Approach 
The term “governmentality” stems from a lecture Michel Foucault gave at the Collège de 
France in 1978 in a course called Securité, territoire, population. In one lecture about the 
activity of governing, Foucault elaborates over the different meanings of the word “conduct” 
(conduit)—for example, as the activity of conducting oneself, in an ethical sense, and as 
conducting behavior, in a normative sense (Foucault 2007: 192-3; Dean 2009: 17). In the 
ethical sense, government is the effort to shape, sculpt and guide choices, needs and lifestyles 
of groups and individuals; it is to govern through freedom in a suggestive way. In the norma-
tive sense, government is to establish a code of conduct to which behavior can be judged and 
regulated. Government is therefore seen as the “conduct of conduct”. Foucault argues that “To 
govern … in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others” (1982: 221). A 
more exhaustive explanation of government as the “conduct of conduct” is that: 
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and form of knowledge, that seeks to 
shape conduct by working though the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, 
for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, ef-
fects and outcomes. (Dean 2010: 18) 
To analyze government in this sense is to analyze the methods of calculation, the types of 
knowledge and techniques, the object to be governed and how it is conceived, the types of 
governing institutions and agencies, and the desired outcomes and consequences. 
Governmentality has two central meanings; a historical meaning that Foucault describes in 
his lectures and a general meaning where governmentality is seen as a semantic linking of the 
words “governing” and “mentality”, thus referring to the way we think about governing 
(Lövbrand et al. 2008). In this sense, governmentality has a specific meaning that has been 
phrased “mentalities of government,” where there is an emphasis on both rational and irra-
tional ways of reasoning (Rose and Miller 1992). In studying governmentality, one 
emphasizes two aspects of governing: firstly, the taxonomization and knowing of a phenome-
non (e.g., the population, society, and economy), which is represented in the episteme of 
governing; and secondly, acting upon the same phenomenon in order to transform it, which is 
represented in the techne of governing (Lövbrand et al. 2008). 
The CFP constitutes, what Dean (2010: 40) calls a “regime of practice,” which is a policy 
area that brings different elements together. The reason for states to act in a community (i.e., 
the EU) is to manage not just fisheries, but also socio-economic problems and market struc-
tures. The CFP makes use of different types of knowledge from economics and biology; it 
makes use of statistical knowledge to keep track of fish stocks and special tactics and different 
management styles to govern fishermen; it addresses a single theme revolving around the 
relationship between society and nature. 
Dean (2010) argues that to gain knowledge about such regimes of practices it is necessary to 
take into account four points of what he calls ‘an analytics of government’. First, an analytics 
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must draw attention to the particular fields of visibility that the government has; what gov-
ernment sees is usually expressed in graphs, tables, maps, or expressions of concerns like that 
of loss of biodiversity. Second, the technical aspect of government, also called techne, re-
volves around: “by what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, 
and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished?” (Dean 2010: 42). Third, is 
the examination of the individual and collective identities that regimes of practices operate 
through and attempt to shape? The question raised is: “what form of person, self, identity are 
presupposed by different practices of government and what sort of transformation do these 
practices seek?” (Dean 2010: 43). Fourth, the rational and thoughtful aspect of governing, 
also called the episteme of government, asks: “What forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, 
strategies, means of calculation, or rationality are employed in the practice of governing?” 
(Dean 2010: 42). Rationality, Dean argues, takes place within a specific time and space (e.g., 
a model, a graph, a text). 
Rationality is, however, a very contested concept and thus there is need for a clear-cut ap-
proach to what is meant by it. Rationality can be thought of as a general meaning of thinking, 
or “any form of thinking which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about 
aspects of ‘external’ or ‘internal’ existence, about how things are and how they ought to be” 
(Dean 2010: 18-9). Max Weber was the first to point out that there is no single, universal 
rationality, but a great variety of rationalities, even within what can be called Western reason 
(Dean 2010: 18-9). Rose and Miller (1992: 179) argue that there is a multiplicity of what they 
call ‘political rationalities’ each possessing an ‘intellectual machinery’ that makes the natural 
reality thinkable. In this view, rationality, knowledge, science, and truth are not detached 
reflections of reality, but become “socially embedded practice interwoven into the fabric of 
rule and authority” (Lövbrand et al. 2008: 8). How this ‘intellectual machinery’ functions can 
be described as kind-making (Miller 2007: 338) which plays a vital role in policy making, as 
it is this knowledge that makes states able to govern different phenomena, such as the econ-
omy or a population. This activity is therefore of special importance and “[through] their day-
to-day conceptual and practical work, scientists classify and reclassify the subjects and objects 
of nature and society, carving up the world into distinct ontological types and occasionally 
creating entirely new taxonomic categories” (Miller 2007: 338). 
The importance of different types of knowledge or activities of reasoning is determined ex-
ogenic to knowledge itself. This is so, because rationality does not exist in a vacuum; it is 
always situated in the context of power. As Foucault pointed to the fact that rationality is 
analytically inseparable from power and vice-versa. Echoing Foucault, Flyvbjerg (2001: 123-
5) asserts that “power defines reality” and elaborates that “power defines, and creates, con-
crete physical, economic, ecological, and social realities” (Flyvbjerg 1998: 227; Flyvbjerg 
2001: 155). Consequently, we must distinguish between formal rationality and realration-
alität and acknowledge the fact that “rationalization presented as rationality is a principal 
strategy in the exercise of power” (Flyvbjerg 1998: 228).2 
Flyvbjerg developed a complex of propositions about the interrelation between rationality 
and power based on rationality as context-dependent, and that the context of rationality is 
power. One of these is that: “in open confrontations, rationality yields to power” (Flyvbjerg 
1998: 232). In open, antagonistic confrontations, actions are directed at what works most 
effectively in winning over one’s opponent. Here, naked and raw power tends to be more 
effective than appealing to rationality, which is why the game of power is played as real-
politik with the use of realrationalität. In short, the argument goes: power has a rationality 
that rationality does not know, whereas rationality has no power that power does not know 
(Flyvbjerg 2001: 155). Another proposition that this paper will later draw upon is that “the 
power of rationality is embedded in stable power relations rather than in confrontations” 
(Flyvbjerg 1998: 299-233). So, to determine how effective or which role the governmentality 
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of biodiversity is going to play, the paper will examine how power is exercised in the political 
framework of the CFP in terms of realpolitik and realrationalität. 
The Genealogy of Biodiversity 
In genealogic research, one is focused on the search for the plurality of concepts, and not a 
typical historical linear approach. The main reason for doing this is that we can show all the 
contradictive views of a concept that there have been in history, thus removing the “taken for 
granted” nature of concepts in a given period of time. Genealogy research methods therefore 
are time consuming and impossible to apply in the limited time available, at least in a single 
paper. Therefore the paper will build on others’ work in this genealogical analysis of biodi-
versity, and the paper relies heavily on Finn Arler’s (2009a, 2009b) doctoral dissertation: 
Biodiversitet [Biodiversity] with the subtitle Videnskab, Kultur, Etik [Science, Culture, Eth-
ics]. 
Biodiversity can be approached, as pointed out by Arler (2009a: 19-20), as an “object of 
interest” (i.e., what is biodiversity?) as well as “reasons for interests” (i.e., why is biodiversity 
important and how do we value it?). The main focus of this paper is the latter; how do we 
value biodiversity, and which arguments can policy-makers bring forward in the defence of 
biodiversity? Arler (2009b) identifies three types of arguments for why we should preserve 
biodiversity: First, the self-centered argument that refers to the utility an organism can bring 
humans, which Arler (2009b) points to as a rather weak argument for the preservation of 
biodiversity, because of the fact that not all species are of utility to humans. Second, the disin-
terested interest argument that refers to human’s ability to distance themselves from self-
related needs, conscribing de-centered values to biodiversity. De-centered values can be 
understood as the observer’s ability to “distance him- or herself from self-related needs” 
(Arler 2009b: 337). The de-centered argument is embedded in the aesthetic, cultural or scien-
tific values that a society has towards biodiversity, which in principle can encompass large 
parts of the biodiversity. Hence, the disinterested interest argument can be a strong argument 
because of the wide spectrum of organisms it catches, all depending on the society in which it 
is put forward. Last, the intrinsic value argument, which refers solely to the organism as hav-
ing value in itself. The intrinsic value argument, however, is hard to handle and if it is to make 
any difference, Arler (2009b: 277) argues that it must distance itself from the disinterested 
interest argument. 
Where Are We Going with Biodiversity and the CFP? 
In the 1970s, important fish stocks were threatened from exhaustion, here among herring, cod, 
mackerel and sole (Raakjær 1994). In 1971, the world catch of fish failed to increase because 
of overfishing, caused by the intensity of fishing and advancement in fishing equipment 
(Shackleton 1983). Consequently, the need for international coordination between countries, 
conservation of fish stocks and management of fishery fleets became apparent (Raakjær 
1994). The experience from the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission had shown that the 
lack of authority, practically national self-interest, had overruled interests in conservation 
ecosystems (Shackleton 1983). The EU’s Act of Accession that was agreed upon in December 
1971, did not, however, include a conservation policy, it only required the establishment of 
one (Hegland 2004). On the contrary it focused mainly on common organizations of the mar-
kets and common structural policies, nevertheless the problems of over-fishing were noted in 
CEC’s work prior to the act: 
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Because of the growing problem of over-fishing, the Council has included provisions to safe-
guard existing resources in territorial water by the introduction of restrictions on the fishing of 
certain species, and on the use of fishing grounds, techniques and seasons. (CEC 1970: 4) 
It was not until 1983 when the CFP was introduced that an actual conservation policy was 
established, although not to create a new fishery management design, but rather to protect the 
status quo (Symes 1997: 140-2). The CFP brought together three aspects of fisheries man-
agement at the European Community level: conservation policy, structural policy, and a 
market policy (Raakjær 1994). The market policy was created to promote stability by apply-
ing common standards in order to optimize quality and to promote rational marketing of fish 
products. The structural policy was created to ensure that the fishing industry could face 
international competition, along with goals of increasing productivity such as to create a fair 
standard of living for the fishing communities and reasonable prices for consumers. The 
conservation policy was created to ensure that fish stocks remain at healthy levels by manag-
ing fish stocks, thus preventing overexploitation by the fishery sector (ibid.: 30-32). 
Vital to the study of governmentality is the examination of fields of visibility of govern-
ment. For example, what does government see and what does it not see? The problem that 
was visible to the Commission and the reason for creating the CFP (besides the desire for a 
common market) was that the fish stocks were exhausted and overfished as a result of the way 
the fisheries were governed—that is, a lack of international coordination. 
The Fisheries Tragedy of the Commons; Conservation of Resources 
Until the 1970s, it was a widespread belief that the resources of the oceans were inexhausti-
ble. However, all this was about to change with the fisheries’ tragedy of the commons. In an 
article called “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Garret Hardin (1968) addressed the problems 
of sharing a common resource on the principle of freedom to all.3 Hardin (1968) starts out by 
picturing a common pasture open to all, a common resource that all herdsmen are free to use. 
It is given that all herdsmen will try to keep as many animals on the pasture as possible. This 
does not pose a problem for now because the carrying capacity of the land has not been 
reached. Meanwhile the population and demand for food grows, consequently, at some point 
in time the carrying capacity of the commons will be reached. It is at this point in time the 
tragedy occurs. Hardin (1968: 1244) assumes that all herdsmen are rational beings, which 
leads them to one question: “What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my 
herd?” The positive utility for a single herdsman is nearly plus one, while all herdsmen share 
the negative utility. This, consequently, means that one herdsman only is responsible by a 
fraction of minus one. Therefore, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible 
course of action is to add one more animal, and another, and another. The same conclusion is 
reached by all the other herdsmen and herein is the tragedy. The result according to Hardin 
(1968: 1244) is dire: 
Ruin is to the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a so-
ciety that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 
(Hardin 1978: 1244) 
Hardin also points specifically to freedoms of the commons other than the pictured pasture 
and the freedom to breed, among other things “freedom of the seas” where maritime nations 
“bring species after species of fish and whales closer to extinction” (Hardin 1968: 1245). 
European fisheries have developed very much according to Hardin’s predictions, creating a 
tragedy of the commons. Fishermen have for a long time freely exploited the seas around 
Europe; however, when the population and the demand for fish increased the tragedy of the 
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fisheries occurred. The overall argument being that fishermen and other resource users will 
prefer decisions and policies that increase short term profits (Hardin 1968). 
An analytics of government seeks to unmask the taken for granted nature of rationalities that 
governments apply in their planning, strategies and policies. It emphasizes the intellectual 
machinery of political rationalities’ ability of “kind-making” and rendering reality thinkable. 
In Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”, the herdsmen or in the case of fisheries, fishermen, 
are rendered thinkable and classified as selfish profit-maximizers. Dean (2009) pointed to the 
internal rationality about how things are and how they ought to be in certain governmental 
rationalities. In the context of fisheries the internal rationality can be explained as follows: the 
common resource (fish) is limited; because all fishermen act as profit-maximizers, they will 
continue to exploit the seas until they bring tragedy to all; in order to conserve the commons 
it is necessary to govern by setting limits for how much fish can be landed and how big the 
fleets need to be and so on. It is this kind of rational and thoughtful activity that government 
needs in order to make planning, strategies, technologies, and mechanisms work in practice. 
Yet, rationalities do not need to be correct and flawless to be suitable as the principle idea 
behind a policy. In fact, Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” might be far from this. David 
Feeny et al. (1990: 13) investigate the prediction Hardin’s model brings forward and they 
contradict and reject Hardin’s claim, because: “the simple one-to-one relationship between 
property-rights regime and outcome postulated by Hardin” does not exist. 
Apart from creating a usable rationality for governments to utilize, Hardin’s herdsman also 
creates the possibility for incorporating certain collective and individual identities. An analyt-
ics of government pays attention to the identities government subscribes to, as well as to the 
people or populations they govern (Dean 2010). The identity subscribed to the fishermen is 
that of the selfish profit-maximizer contrary to government, which is seen as economically 
responsible. However, the fisheries do not only consist of fishermen, but also fishing indus-
tries. By distinguishing between the different actors the conclusion becomes somewhat 
different. Brox (2002) challenges this view by attributing the selfish profit-maximizer to 
fishing industries (ranging from multi-national corporations to one-man businesses), while 
giving “household” community fisheries only an “income goal”. David Feeny et al. and Brox’ 
views imply that policy design cannot rely on simple models of rational actors to achieve its 
goals; there is need for a more complex understanding of fisheries than that of Hardin’s 
herdsmen. 
Nonetheless, Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” has become the philosophical basis for a 
central control management regime in the EU (Gray and Hatchard 2003), especially in DG 
Fish (under the Commission) with a strong connection to the scientific community. Lequesne 
(2000: 354) points to three core assumptions within the DG Fish: that fishermen have a natu-
ral tendency to overfish; that it is the Commission’s job to convince member states to adopt 
conservation regulatory measures; and that it is necessary to produce statistical models and 
projections on fish stocks in order to convince politicians about the extent of the problem. 
Furthermore, Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” opens up for the development of various 
tools, instruments, techniques, or in general techne for governments to create conservation 
policy (Charles 1992). In the CFP, a set of techne was developed to manage the fisheries such 
as the Total Allowable Catches-system (TAC), the Multi-Annual Guidance Program 
(MAGP), and mechanisms of national implementation and regulatory responsibility along 
with other minor technical measures to secure safe and sustainable exploitation of the fisher-
ies (Raakjær 1994).4 
In 1983, the Commission issued that: “the conservation and management of Atlantic and 
North Sea fish stocks are to be controlled by the fixing of total allowable catches” (CEC 
1983: 3). The TAC-system is the essential mechanisms in the conservation policy of the CFP 
(Raakjær 1994, 2009). The TACs are fixed in the Council of Ministers on the basis of scien-
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tific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the 
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). The TAC is thereafter 
divided up in quotas, which are then distributed among the member states based on the prin-
ciple of ‘relative stability’. That means that each country receives quotas according to 
traditional fishing patterns, the special needs of areas heavily dependent on fisheries, and 
compensation for losses caused by the extension of coastal limits in third-country waters 
(CEC 1983: 3). 
One of the other technical aspects of the CFP is the MAGP, where the aim is to reduce the 
overcapacity of fishing fleets. The idea is that there are “too many fisheries chasing too few 
fish” thus calling for a “rationalization” of the fishery from an economic perspective (Charles 
1992: 368). The Commission (1992: 25) concluded that there was a large overcapacity in the 
EU fleet and in order to ensure a coherent balance between fishing capacity and activity, and 
the size of fish stocks, it was necessary to reduce the level of activity of the fleets. Fishing 
capacity was then defined in terms of tonnage and engine power; however, there are many 
other factors that determine the fishing mortality generated by the fleet. Consequently, the 
MAGP III and IV failed to prevent the increase in efficiency caused by technological ad-
vancement and the problems of overcapacity continued.5 Instead, the EU abandoned the 
MAGPs, and in 2003 implemented a strict and simpler “entry-exit” strategy (Raakjær 2009: 
81). Furthermore, the success of the conservation policy highly depends on the mechanisms of 
national implementation and regulatory responsibility—that is to say, that: “the success of 
conservation policy depends on the degree to which the Member States comply with policies 
decided at EC level” (Raakjær 2009: 30). 
Building on the genealogical analysis of biodiversity, the following question arises: what is 
the relationship between society and nature in the conservation policy? In terms of taxono-
mies, the early CFP places an exclusive interest in fish species with commercial value. The 
defense for biodiversity or the concern for conservation of fish stocks therefore takes its de-
parture in self-centered values, where different species of commercial fish are regarded as a 
resource, of utility value, a product, or a means of income. 
Establishing a Governmentality of Biodiversity 
E. O. Wilson first used the term ‘biodiversity’ in 1985 at the conference National Forum on 
Biodiversity (NFB). At the NFB conference, Wilson (1988: 3) argued that: “Biological diver-
sity must be treated more seriously as a global resource, to be indexed, used, and above all, 
preserved”. The term was thus partly introduced to make broader groups aware of the problem 
of the “falling diversity” (Arler 2009a: 16). Debates about biodiversity have since revolved 
around specific themes or issues, such as: assessment of biodiversity, falling diversity, and the 
level of human impact on biodiversity. On 5 June 1992, the UN organized a Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) where the member states agreed on a comprehensive strategy for 
sustainable development, definitions and goals for the preservation of biodiversity. At the first 
CBD, member states agreed to be: 
Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic, social, eco-
nomic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity 
and its components. (CBD 1992: 1) 
That biodiversity now has all these new types of value is somewhat different from the heavy 
emphasis on self-centered values ascribed to biodiversity in the CFP’s conservation policy, 
where focus was exclusively on the commercial value of fish as a resource. The declaration of 
these new values brings with it a new discourse that was not encompassed in the field of 
visibility of the CFP prior to the convention. Government’s problem is now not only that 
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commercial fish stocks are in a crisis, but rather the greater crisis of global loss of biodiver-
sity. The ideas expressed at the CBD forces governments to rethink the way they 
conceptualize both themselves and fishermen when making new legislation. If we truly are to 
regard biodiversity as having de-centered and intrinsic value, then fishermen can no longer 
only be the selfish profit-maximizers and government no longer only economically responsi-
ble, they both have a moral imperative to protect and preserve biodiversity. 
Since the initial use at the NFB and the CBD in 1992, biodiversity has been used in scien-
tific, ethical, cultural, political, juridical, economic, and administrative debates all over the 
world (Arler 2009a: 14). Apart from the CBD in 1992, biodiversity has made its way into 
many international and regional organizations such as: Global Biodiversity Forum (GBF) 
established in 1993; the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF), an initiative by 
OECD in 1999; and The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), started in 2007 
by G8 countries. These have different purposes ranging from mapping, assessing, and catego-
rizing, to guiding policy formulation with the aim of preservation of biodiversity. 
What these organizations are involved in is the establishment of a governmentality of biodi-
versity. The organizations all engage in producing episteme for the purpose of making 
governing possible—the GBF by making a forum for scientists, NGOs and other communities 
a voice in international decision-making. The GBIF is mainly distributing knowledge about 
biodiversity, whereas TEEB focus on the economic and policy guiding perspectives of ration-
ality production. Nevertheless, biodiversity grew as a particular, historically produced, 
discourse in a network of “international organizations and northern NGOs to scientists, pros-
pectors, and local communities and social movements” (Escobar 1998: 53-4). As pointed out 
by Escobar, we could start out by questioning whether biodiversity really exists, and instead 
place it as an artificial construct, claiming that: “biodiversity does not exist in an absolute 
sense” (Escobar 1998: 54-5). Biodiversity is rather a discourse that renews the relationship 
between society and nature, in an all-new narrative that “if you want to save the planet, this is 
what you must do, and here are the knowledge and resources to do it” (Escobar 1998: 56). 
This narrative, embedded within the actor network, forms and creates new types of knowledge 
and truths about biodiversity that can be used to govern: 
Intervention in the network is done by means of models (e.g., of ecosystems, conservation strate-
gies); theories (e.g., of development, restoration); objects (from plants and genes to various 
technologies); actors (prospectors, taxonomists, planners, experts); strategies (resource manage-
ment, intellectual property rights). (Escobar 1998: 54) 
As highlighted earlier, governmentality studies pay close attention to the episteme of govern-
ment and insist that governments produce truth and apply knowledge, calculation, expertise 
and strategies in their practices of governing. Furthermore, it stresses the point that this 
knowledge is not detached reflections of reality, but a socially embedded practice placed in 
the context of power. By making models and theories, defining objects and forming strategies, 
scientists and biologists become actors in the game of power concerning the preservation of 
biodiversity. Here, the governmentality of biodiversity, contrary to the old governmental ideas 
in the CFP, takes point in de-centered and intrinsic values and wishes to empower the expert. 
New Goals for Biodiversity in the EU in 1998 
The loss of biodiversity is also a concern for the EU, and in 1998 the Commission published a 
paper called “A European Community Biodiversity Strategy”. The paper deals with chal-
lenges of biodiversity loss, drawing upon the new values from the CBD in 1992 for the 
defense of preserving biodiversity, and a proper response in the form of policy objectives. In 
the paper, the use of de-centered and intrinsic values becomes clear when fisheries, fishing 
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and fish stocks not only refers to the commercial value of fish, but also non-target species 
such as: “molluscs, crustaceans, marine mammals and other marine or estuarine animals” 
(CEC 1998: 13). Yet no concrete policy formulations are to find in the paper, only objectives 
and intentions.6 Nonetheless, in 2001 the heads of states in the EU reached the conclusion to 
“halt the decline of biodiversity [in the EU] by 2010”. In the publication “The European 
Union’s Biodiversity Action Plan - Halting the loss of biodiversity by 2010 – and beyond” 
from 2008, published in a reader friendly layout, the Commission in the very beginning (page 
4) exemplifies in which way biodiversity should be valued:7 
Economically, biodiversity sustains our economy and our quality of life. It provides us with a 
whole range of direct economic benefits that are all too often unrecognised and undervalued. 
Emotionally, biodiversity has an intrinsic value. It supports our cultural identity, offers spiritual 
inspiration and solace, and plays an important role in our mental and physical well-being. 
Ethically, we have a moral duty to look after our planet and preserve its richness for the benefit 
and enjoyment of generations to come. (CEC 2008: 4) 
Yet policy makers do not emphasize or have great understanding for deep-ecological argu-
ments for preserving biodiversity (Arler 2009b). So the question remains: how much weight 
will the ‘de-centered and intrinsic values’ arguments carry in the political debate? Moreover, 
and not surprisingly, the CEC emphasizes that safeguarding biodiversity is more than just a 
moral preoccupation; it is an “economic imperative” (CEC 2008: 4). 
Since the 1980s, the CFP has been revised nearly every tenth year and when the Commis-
sion published the 1991 report it concluded that “present mechanisms are inadequate” (CEC 
1991: III) to secure a sustainable fishery sector, pointing out the need to balance fishing activ-
ity and capacity with the size of fish stocks. However, in 2001 the Commission released a 
Green Paper on the future of the CFP concluding that it had not met the goals from 1991 and 
further: “The policy has not delivered sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources and will 
need to be changed if it is to do so” (CEC 2001a: 4). 
In previous revisions the Commission had focused exclusively on the commercial fish 
stocks as a resource with direct utility for society, and that it was inconceivable that fisheries 
were responsible for the destruction of marine habitats. However, this changed in the 2001 
Green Paper where future goals are considered:8 
[T]o establish responsible and sustainable fisheries that ensure healthy marine ecosystems main-
taining the quality, diversity and availability of marine resources and habitats. To that end there is 
an urgent need to strengthen and improve the conservation policy in order to reverse the current 
negative trends of many stocks. (CEC 2001a: 20) 
The 2001 Green Paper was followed by CEC’s four specific sectorial action plans in the areas 
of Economic and Development Co-operation, Fisheries, Agriculture and Conservation of 
Natural Resources (CEC 2001b; Queffelec 2009). However, not much has happened in terms 
of implementation. In the BAPF, there were not any new ideas on how to manage fisheries. 
On the contrary, the solution posed was to: “[optimize] the use of available measures under 
the reformed CFP” (CEC 2006b: 12). However, it should be noted that “long-term manage-
ment and recovery plans are being developed to help rebuild collapsed fish stocks and 
maintain others at safe biological levels” (CEC 2008: 15). Nonetheless, a strategy relying on 
strengthening and improving the conservation policy could prove fatal for biodiversity in EU 
waters. 
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The CFP: A Political System in Crisis 
The establishment of an Action Plan for Biodiversity does not necessarily mean that prevent-
ing further loss of biodiversity will go easy. The CFP is a political system in crisis, where 
decision-making processes get caught in a “joint decisions trap” (Raakjær 2009: 60)9. The 
following section of the paper will regard the BAPF as an expression of the governmentality 
of biodiversity, placed in the context of power, that of the CFP, examining the question: who 
wins and who loses by which mechanisms of power. 
One such mechanism is change and political reform. The fisheries in the EU are composed 
of many different interests. First, the CFP covers different ecosystems (the Baltic Sea, the 
North Sea, north-western waters, south-western waters, and the Mediterranean Sea); second, 
the member states have different business structures (from the large-scale, high-tech, and 
capital-intensive fisheries to the small-scale, low-capital fisheries); and third, the clash of 
interest between fisheries and conservation interest (Raakjær 2009). Overall there were three 
political positions expressed in the 2002 reform. First, the Commission that has interest in 
reforming the CFP, with support from the scientific community in the technocratic and ad-
ministrative approach, emphasizing the need for radical reforms and a stronger conservation 
policy. The main strategy employed by the Commission is that power defines reality. With the 
help of various institutions (e.g., ICES and STECF) and scientists, as this paper has argued, 
the CEC produces truth, rationality and knowledge about the fishery sector, fishermen, fish 
stocks, and ecosystems. Second, the network “Friends of Fishing” or Amis de la Pêche com-
posed of Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, and Ireland that has its interest in securing the 
short-term livelihood of fishermen and fishing communities and is opposed to what they 
consider an overly-conservationist approach by the Commission. The network itself also 
engages in production of rationality by making publications on joint conclusions and counter-
proposals (Raakjær 2009; Hegland 2004). Third, “Friends of Fish” founded by representatives 
from Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark that has its interest 
in reforming the CFP, but in a less radical way than the Commission (Hegland 2004). 
In the 2002 reform process, the antagonistic position taken by the “Friends of Fishing” and 
impartial position taken by “Friends of Fish” has caused an effective deadlock on how the 
decision-making in the CFP can unfold, which prevents the Council to “elaborate comprehen-
sive strategies for rational changes of the CFP” (Raakjær 2009: 76). Considering Flyvbjerg’s 
proposition that in open confrontations rationality yields to power, the Commission did not do 
itself or the conservation policy any favors. The Commission, as argued by Hegland (2004), 
sometimes engages in antagonistic power confrontations with the “Friends of Fishing” net-
work by making exaggerated proposals. The Commission sometimes attempts to win power 
struggles by pushing arguments further than what is needed. As a Commission official put it 
in November 2003: 
Any Commission proposal is a sort of mixture of what we honestly believe should be the final 
outcome and what we need to propose in order to get the final outcome that we want. (Hegland 
2004: 60) 
All in all, changing and reforming the CFP seems difficult if it ends in open confrontations 
between the Commission and the “Friends of Fishing” every time reform or change is needed. 
If rationality, that is the governmentality of biodiversity, has the best possibilities in stable 
power relations, then rationality ultimately becomes the loser when the main feature of the 
CFP is unstable power relations dominated by the rationality of power. Consequently, the 
governmentality of biodiversity seen as rationality will have hard terms if the CFP is to suc-
cessfully be promoting the use of rationality. 
Another mechanism is that of the annual TAC setting. When the TAC setting process is 
running, most member states tend to follow domestic interests for maximizing fishery activity 
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and for a joint front against the Commission’s proposals. The result is that the Council adopts 
far higher TACs than recommended by the scientific advice and thereby creates long-term 
negative consequences for fish stocks and fishery communities. The Commission explains in 
the Green Paper: 
The current situation of resource depletion results, to a good extent, from setting annual catch 
limits in excess of those proposed by the Commission on the basis of scientific advice, and from 
fleet management plans short of those required. Poor enforcement of decisions actually taken has 
also contributed to over-fishing. [And later added] Difficulties with TACs are due to the Coun-
cil’s systematic fixing, in some cases, at levels higher than indicated in the scientific advice. 
(CEC 2001a: 4-8) 
Raakjær (2009) points to three explanations for this phenomenon: First, that ministers argue 
for higher TACs because of pressure from domestic fishing sector representatives with short 
term interest in protecting their business, arguing that survival of fishing communities should 
be put before fish. Second, that if ministers are too hard on their colleagues one year pushing 
for lower TACs, they will have a weaker bargaining position the next year—thus, pacifying 
the decision-making process so that no big changes can be implemented. Third, that ministers 
intentionally question the scientific assessments processes because if the scientific advice 
cannot be questioned it ties the system down, which leaves them no room for maneuvers of 
self-interest and “horse-trading” in the Council. By this example, power defines what be-
comes considered as knowledge, and the Council treats the rationality of the Commission and 
the scientific community as rationalization. 
The TAC setting mechanism relies heavily on the Council being interested in following the 
scientific advice from the Commission and scientific community, yet there is no incentive for 
them to do so. When the TAC setting finally relies on the power of the Council, rationality 
has a very small chance of success. The result is that the CFP becomes the tragedy it was 
created to prevent. 
Conclusion: Is Sailing in Dead Waters Desirable? 
The first section of the paper dealt with the creation of the CFP. The decline of fish stocks due 
to overfishing was identified as the field of visibility of government. Hardin’s “Tragedy of the 
Commons” was used as a metaphor for what government observed. The “Tragedy of the 
Commons” was also the main source of knowledge, rationality, and of what could be consid-
ered truth. In this governmentality, fishermen and government were attributed certain 
identities. The fishermen were regarded as profit-maximizers who caused the tragedy of the 
fisheries. Contrary to this, government was considered as economically responsible and acted 
to prevent the tragedy. To do this, government relied on the conservation policy that had the 
TAC system and MAGPs as its main technologies. The CFPs interest in biodiversity was 
reflected solely in self-centered values, concerned only with the well-being of commercially 
valued fish stocks. Consequently, the preservation of biodiversity, in a broad sense, did not 
have good conditions. 
The second section of the paper dealt with the invention of the concept of biodiversity and 
the establishment of a governmentality on biodiversity. “The global loss of biodiversity” was 
found to be the new field of visibility for government. Taking its starting point in mainly de-
centered and intrinsic values, the knowledge, rationality and truth of the governmentality of 
biodiversity suggested empowering the experts. The main argument being: “if you want to 
save the planet, this is what you must do, and here are the knowledge and resources to do it”. 
The identities attributed to both fishermen and government is that they must comply with the 
moral imperative to protect and preserve biodiversity. 
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The third section of the paper dealt with the EU’s BAPF and the merging of the governmen-
tality of the CFP and that of biodiversity. It was found that the CFP had renewed its field of 
visibility to include global loss of biodiversity although with some special dedication to the 
tragedy of the commons. The CEC puts its main argument for the preservation of biodiversity 
on the economic imperative rather than the moral imperative established in the governmental-
ity of biodiversity. Also, the BAPF seeks mainly to optimize the old techne (with only new 
ones in the making), which could prove fatal for the biodiversity of EU waters. 
This brings us to the last point: who wins and who loses by which mechanisms of power? 
Placing the governmentality of biodiversity as rationality in the context of power it proves 
ineffective and with no real impact. It would be true to uphold that rationality must see itself 
outplayed by power in the context of the CFP, and by this Flyvbjerg’s (2001:155) dictum 
proves very useful: power has a rationality that rationality does not know, whereas rationality 
has no power that power does not know. So to answer the question how biodiversity is gov-
erned within the CFP, this paper would argue: poorly. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to 
follow the reform process and see how the knowledge-power relations are changing within the 
CFP. 
Notes 
1. This paper is based on a 7th semester Development and International Relations project report by the same 
title. In the rewriting process, I owe a great many thanks to Freja Schaumburg-Müller Pallesen, Dave 
Allington, and the two reviewers for valuable comments and suggestions. 
2. Flyvbjerg (1998: 228) elaborates on formal rationality and realrationalität: “The freedom to interpret and 
use ‘rationality’ and ‘rationalization’ for the purpose of power is a crucial element in enabling power to 
define reality, hence, an essential feature of the rationality of power”. 
3. In “Tragedy of the Commons”, Hardin was addressing the growing problem of overpopulation arguing 
that we had to regulate how much humans were allowed to breed. He concluded that “Freedom to breed 
brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968: 1248). 
4. Various surveillance measures: obligatory logbooks, port inspections, aerial patrols, etc. which the mem-
ber states are responsible for (CEC 1983: 7). 
5. The green paper from the Commission (CEC 2001a: 11) concluded that: “Continuation of the current 
system would not only be unable to cut the excessive capacity of the fleet but would lead to an increased 
fishing effort in a situation where the state of the stocks cannot even support the present effort”. 
6. Nevertheless, in “Fisheries Management and Nature Conservation in the Marine Environment” (1999: 3) 
the CEC declared that: “interactions between fisheries and marine ecosystems must hence forth be inte-
grated into the CFP”. 
7. Although some of the arguments can be found in earlier publications (CEC 1998: 1; 2006b: 3) where the 
arguments are not as clear-cut formulated. 
8. Only in the revision of 1992 is it noted that fishery resources form a link in the food chain and that ex-
ploitation has an impact on the marine ecosystems, but that it is difficult to assess the global impact of 
fisheries, as there has been little research carried out in the field (CEC 1992: 21). 
9. The “joint decisions trap” was introduced to describe situations in the council based on unanimous deci-
sions. On the contrary, most decisions regarding the CFP are adopted under qualified majority voting. 
Raakjær uses the term to describe when various groups form a blocking minority. See (Raakjær 2009: 
60). 
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